Read the full essay here.
This essay overturns a consensus among scholars and strategists: that only broad, pre-electoral coalitions can unseat dominant parties in competitive authoritarian systems. The evidence is two surprising reversals—Hungary in 2026, where the single Tisza party swept Orbán’s Fidesz, and Turkey in 2024, where the Republican People’s Party (CHP), running alone, won landmark local elections. In both countries, sprawling opposition fronts had failed badly just a year or two earlier. The authors argue that it was consolidation around a single credible party, and not coalition breadth, that proved decisive—an outcome reached less by design than through contingency. They also stress how context shapes an autocrat’s options: EU membership constrained Orbán to keep up legal appearances, while Turkey’s strategic leverage gave Erdoğan freer rein for outright repression. Whether Tisza can convert its breakthrough into democratic renewal, and whether the CHP can win nationally amid mounting repression, the authors conclude, remains to be seen.
Image Credit: Ferenc ISZA / AFP via Getty Images