Under Netanyahu, Israel has become a competitive authoritarian regime. The country’s upcoming elections are its best chance to halt Israel’s democratic backsliding before it’s too late.
By Oded Haklai and Andrew O’Donohue
October 2026
As Israel heads to elections on 27 October 2026, the country stands on the brink of deepening authoritarianism. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has held office for more than nineteen years and has increasingly weakened checks on his government’s power. That longstanding pattern of democratic backsliding has now crossed a critical threshold. We argue that by the criteria laid out in Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s foundational work, Israel since 2023 has slid into competitive authoritarianism — a political regime whose elections are real and competitive, but in which the incumbent’s abuse of state power gives it a significant advantage over opponents. Specifically, by politicizing state institutions such as the police, harassing independent media, and denying equal media access, the Netanyahu government has tilted the playing field in its favor.
But the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Israel does not mean that Netanyahu is invincible — far from it. A close look at the country’s politics reveals regime unevenness, as authoritarian practices in some domains, such as politicization of security services, coexist with democratic resilience in others, such as the still independent judiciary and attorney general. Moreover, Israel’s opposition remains highly competitive and unseated Netanyahu as recently as 2021, if only for a brief period. However, a win for the incumbent government would accelerate its capture of state institutions. Whichever government wins the October elections could appoint up to ten Supreme Court justices — two-thirds of Israel’s top court — as well as a new attorney general. An incumbent victory in October would thus be a tipping point for the regime, deepening Israel’s decline into competitive authoritarianism and darkening the prospects for democratic recovery.
The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism in Israel
Since Netanyahu returned to office in late December 2022, democratic backsliding in Israel has crossed the line into competitive authoritarianism. Using Levitsky and Way’s framework, we find evidence of three key indicators of competitive authoritarianism in Israel since 2023: the incumbent’s politicization of state institutions, harassment of independent media, and uneven access to media. By Levitsky and Way’s criteria, any one of these indicators is sufficient to tip a democracy into competitive authoritarianism. To be sure, Israel remains electorally competitive, yet the government’s systematic and sustained abuse of power has skewed the playing field in its favor.
The first indicator of competitive authoritarianism in Israel is the government’s politicization of state institutions, especially the police and security services. After the government appointed Itamar Ben-Gvir as national security minister in December 2022, Ben-Gvir “weaponized Israel’s police” against antigovernment protesters, opposition politicians, and ethnic minorities while enabling impunity for allies. At Ben-Gvir’s insistence, the government amended the law governing the police to expand his authority, including over criminal investigations and police operations. Furthermore, after appointing a compliant police commissioner in 2024, Ben-Gvir intervened extensively in police appointments and promotions, creating a system of patronage in which Ben-Gvir reportedly asked candidates whether they would be “loyal” to him personally.
The result has been an acute politicization of policing. Ben-Gvir endorsed the use of stun grenades and aggressive tactics against antigovernment protests, but not against ultra-Orthodox antidraft protests. Officers who used force against antigovernment protesters were repeatedly promoted, whereas an officer who testified in the criminal trial against Prime Minister Netanyahu was denied promotion — a decision that Israel’s judiciary subsequently annulled. Police officers have reportedly called themselves the “Ben-Gvir police” when confronting Arabs and antigovernment protesters. Since Ben-Gvir took office, 96 percent of anti-incitement investigations launched by police were against Arab citizens of Israel. Furthermore, as the police have become increasingly politicized, progovernment thugs, such as convicted criminal Mordechai David, have become emboldened with a sense of impunity and have streamed themselves harassing opposition figures, journalists, protesters, and judges. This politicization of the police has contributed to declining public confidence. A 2025 survey found that 61 percent of Israelis think the police are not “politically neutral.”
Another state institution that the government has politicized is the Israel Security Agency, commonly known as the Shin Bet or Shabak. In 2025, the government pushed Shin Bet director Ronen Bar out of office while the agency was investigating officials in the prime minister’s office, including over allegations that aides leaked classified information to the prime minister’s advantage, altered official records, and were receiving payments from Qatar — a scandal known as “Qatargate.” Bar himself suggested that his removal was meant to undermine these politically sensitive investigations into the prime minister’s office. Bar also testified in an affidavit to the Supreme Court that Netanyahu pressured him to use the Shin Bet to surveil antigovernment protestors. Following Bar’s removal, his successor, David Zini, stated that he accepted the position because of his “ability to be loyal to the elected leadership, no matter the opinion.” Although Israel’s Supreme Court barred Zini from overseeing the Qatar investigation, after Zini assumed office the Shin Bet downgraded the prominence of the Qatargate investigation against Netanyahu’s aides. Furthermore, under Zini, the Shin Bet refused to provide security to Netanyahu’s chief rival, Gadi Eisenkot, ahead of the 2026 elections, despite threats against him and the recommendation of an advisory committee on the protection of public figures.
A second hallmark of competitive authoritarianism is the government’s frequent harassment of independent media. To be sure, the government has not eliminated independent journalism: The newspaper Haaretz, Channels 12 and 13, and the public broadcaster Kan continue to criticize the government. Instead, the Netanyahu government has used state power to pressure critical media outlets while supporting sympathetic ones. In April 2024, Israel’s parliament passed a law granting the executive branch powers to shut down foreign broadcast networks deemed a “security risk.” Using the powers under this law, the government temporarily seized equipment from the Associated Press and blocked its live video of Gaza before reversing these actions after criticism. Moreover, in November 2024, Israel’s government effectively ordered a boycott of Haaretz by requiring government officials and any government-funded body to avoid communicating with or placing advertisements in the paper. In January 2026, government ministers collectively decided to boycott Channel 12, claiming that its broadcasts were fake, anti-Israel propaganda. On top of that, journalists have faced intimidation and threats, including vandalism of media offices, increased violent rhetoric from progovernment social-media accounts, and livestreamed street confrontations with thugs.
A third indicator of competitive authoritarianism is that the government has used state power to favor progovernment outlets and create unequal media access. Of particular relevance is Channel 14, which has benefited from regulatory decisions that facilitated its expansion and exempted it from some requirements imposed on other commercial broadcasters. Likewise, in 2026, the government used emergency regulations to expand the broadcast reach of two radio stations associated with the religious right, providing them with greater access to audiences and advertising revenue. This systematic politicization of state institutions (especially the police and security agencies), harassment of independent media, and unequal media access (including the discretionary use of licenses and regulations) are textbook indicators of competitive authoritarianism.
Democratic Resistance and Regime Unevenness in Israel
Despite this slide into competitive authoritarianism, pockets of resistance remain in the country. Israel is a striking case of regime unevenness, in which authoritarian practices in certain domains coexist with democratic resilience in others. Indeed, as Israel approaches its 2026 elections, the opposition remains highly competitive. Moreover, some guardrail institutions — most importantly, the attorney general and the Supreme Court — have retained their independence, and their rulings have repeatedly constrained the government’s abuse of power.
The Netanyahu government’s pressure on Israel’s attorney general and judiciary has encountered significant institutional resistance. Government ministers have repeatedly attacked Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, sought her dismissal, and disregarded some of her legally binding opinions. In 2025, the cabinet changed the procedure for dismissing the attorney general and voted unanimously to remove her — yet the Supreme Court froze and subsequently annulled this decision. Likewise, the Supreme Court halted the government’s attempt to politicize the Department of Internal Police Investigations. The Supreme Court also faced an acute challenge to its own independence from the government’s proposed judicial changes in 2023, which sought to expand political influence over judicial appointments, constrain judicial review, and increase the parliament’s ability to override court decisions. However, mass mobilization halted many of these proposed changes, and the Supreme Court itself struck down a law to reduce the judiciary’s power. Ahead of the 2026 elections, the high court has acted as an important check against abuses of power — in particular, by blocking the government from appointing Netanyahu’s personal lawyer as state comptroller and by unanimously overturning an attempt to ban Israel’s Arab political parties.
Faced with a still independent judiciary, the government has piled pressure on the courts. In 2025, the government passed legislation to increase elected politicians’ power over selecting judges, which will come into effect after the 2026 elections. The government has also applied pressure to the judiciary by blocking judicial appointments, leaving the Supreme Court without a permanent chief justice for sixteen months and four unfilled vacancies on the Supreme Court. Continued refusal by political officials to recognize the chief justice and the government’s decisions to disregard court rulings further indicate sustained executive challenges to judicial authority, although the courts have retained significant capacity to resist.
The Critical Juncture Ahead for Israel’s Regime
Israel’s remaining checks and balances, however, are at stake in the upcoming elections. After the vote, changes to the law regulating the selection of judges will come into effect, enabling the politicization of that process. Previously, Israel’s judicial selection process necessitated compromise between the legislature, executive, and judiciary — in particular, by requiring a supermajority of seven of nine members on the committee to appoint a new justice. The new rules for the judicial selection committee will require only a simple majority to appoint Supreme Court justices — and change the composition of the selection committee to increase the power of elected politicians.
These new rules will make it considerably easier for governments to appoint political allies to Israel’s highest court. Amplifying the effect of this institutional shift, whoever wins the 2026 elections will appoint up to ten Supreme Court justices, filling the court’s four current vacancies plus six more that will arise before October 2030 due to the mandatory retirement age for justices. Furthermore, Attorney General Baharav-Miara’s term will come to an end after elections in February 2028, which would enable a future Netanyahu government to appoint a political ally to the position. And while in the past the Supreme Court might have hindered the politicization of the position, a new, politicized court is less likely to do so.
Thus the stakes of Israel’s October vote are high. The country stands at a critical juncture, in which a government victory would deepen Israel’s descent into competitive authoritarianism — but in which an opposition victory is possible and could yet contain it.
Oded Haklai is full professor in the Department of Political Studies and director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy and Diversity at Queen’s University (Kingston) and vice-president of the Association for Israel Studies. Andrew O’Donohue is a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Copyright © 2026 JoD Productions Inc
Image Credit: Erik Marmor/Getty Images)
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