October 1993, Volume 4, Issue 4
Donald L. Horowitz
Articles by Donald L. Horowitz:
Fall 1990, Volume 1, Issue 4
April 2014, Volume 25, Issue 2
In severely divided societies, ethnic cleavages tend to produce ethnic parties and ethnic voting. Power-sharing institutions can ameliorate this problem, but attempts to establish such institutions, whether based on a consociational or a centripetal model, face formidable difficulties.
October 2003, Volume 14, Issue 4
The rules that govern voting will always be of vital importance in any democracy. The beginning of wisdom is to turn from the usual focus on electoral systems in order to reflect on larger goals and the trade-offs among them that may be necessary.
October 2006, Volume 17, Issue 4
Courts empowered to overturn legislative acts have spread rapidly in recent years. If carefully designed and limited, constitutional courts may aid democratic consolidation, but if not, they can become objects of political strife, impediments to democracy, and bad influences on legal development.