South Korea is about to elect a new president. North Korea has changed in recent years. Seoul’s approach to the Kim regime must change to reflect new risks — and Korea’s democratic strength.
May 2025
On June 3, South Koreans will elect a new president — the next step in moving past the turmoil precipitated by former president Yoon Suk Yeol’s ill-advised declaration of martial law in December 2024, and his subsequent impeachment. Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party is the strong frontrunner in the race, raising the prospect of a progressive again holding the presidency.
A key strategic choice facing South Korea’s next president will be his approach to relations with North Korea. Earlier this month, Lee signaled that he may revert to previous progressive policies that emphasize intergovernmental cooperation between the North and South and attempt to build trust with Pyongyang. Returning to the progressive status quo ante, however, would be both a mistake and a missed opportunity.
The environment in Pyongyang has shifted dramatically since 2017, when a progressive candidate, Moon Jae-in, last won the presidency. The North Korean regime has since rejected reunification as a national goal, formally named South Korea an enemy, and joined Russia as a cobelligerent in its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
South Korea’s next president cannot afford to ignore these developments and the risks they pose. Instead, Lee should embrace South Korea’s liberal-democratic identity as the cornerstone of inter-Korean relations, aligning the country’s global brand with one of its most enduring national priorities. Doing so will require an unusual degree of vision and political courage — but South Korea’s next president must make the most of this opportunity.
Competing Visions of Democracy
Every president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) since 1948 has pursued reunification — adding a third strategic imperative to the goals of security and economic prosperity that most heads of state pursue. Managing inter-Korean relations therefore adds a layer of complexity to South Korea’s domestic and foreign policymaking. While there has been some broad consistency since Seoul’s democratization in the late 1980s, approaches to North Korea tend to differ across the progressive-conservative divide.
The debate over inter-Korean policy reflects divergent conceptions of what liberal democracy means for South Korea. History and identity guide how progressives or conservatives seek reunification with an authoritarian rival. The two camps differ over which rights to emphasize when formulating inter-Korean relations; how to sequence rights and political integration when discussing unification between two starkly different political systems; and who is a legitimate participant in the design and execution of inter-Korean policy.
Korean progressives emphasize economic and social rights in their stance toward the North, and focus on improving the welfare of North Koreans through intergovernmental rapprochement with Pyongyang — a process that has often led them to constrain the role of civil society organizations and activists to keep political dialogue going. Conservatives treat consideration of civil and political rights as a precondition for discussions of unification. They are skeptical of the compromises necessary to achieve rapprochement with Pyongyang, and elevate the role of North Korean defectors, including those who openly call for political change to the Kim regime, rather than prioritizing intergovernmental contact.
These differences were starkly visible during the last progressive presidency, that of Moon Jae-in (2017–22). Moon, who followed conservative presidents Park Geun-hye (2013–17) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–13), sought to restart inter-Korean head-of-state summits, culminating in the Panmunjom Declaration with Kim Jong-un in 2018 in which the two leaders pledged to work to reduce tensions and pursue reconciliation, including a formal end to the Korean War.
At the same time, however, Moon’s government reduced funding for civil society groups, particularly those that engaged in defector-led activism, and justified such measures on the grounds that they posed an obstacle to government efforts at inter-Korean rapprochement. For example, in May 2020, after a complaint from Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, the Moon government criminalized the launch of balloons carrying information into North Korea, a campaign spearheaded by North Korean defector-activists and backed by international human-rights groups.
In a decision that sparked domestic and international backlash, the Moon government repatriated two North Korean defectors who had sought asylum in the South, denying them aspects of due process such as access to legal counsel, a hearing, and the right to appeal that are normally afforded to ROK citizens — a category that South Korea has long insisted includes North Koreans. In taking these steps, Moon Jae-in joined a line of progressive presidents from Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) onward who have been criticized for prioritizing top-down forms of inter-Korean engagement at the expense of the rights of the North Korean people, and of propping up a corrupt, repressive government with little to show in return.
Moon was succeeded by conservative president Yoon Suk Yeol, who advocated for a different relationship between South Korea’s identity as a liberal democracy and its inter-Korean policy objectives. (As I have written elsewhere, Yoon’s emphasis on liberal democracy, and the concrete ways that he incorporated that emphasis in South Korea’s foreign policy, made his December invocation of martial law especially shocking to outside observers — and ultimately, deadly to his presidency.)
Before his impeachment, however, Yoon proposed a vision of “unification grounded in liberal democracy,” articulated in a March 2024 policy agenda released by the Ministry of Unification. Under this approach, human rights formed the foundation of the pursuit of unification, rather than being framed as an obstacle to it. Yoon’s government also incorporated human-rights advocacy into South Korean diplomatic activity; re-funded civil society work on North Korean human rights; increased the resettlement-assistance grants given to North Korean defectors in the South; declared a new holiday recognizing North Korean defectors; and objected to Chinese repatriation of North Korean defectors. A white paper released by the Ministry of Unification highlighted these efforts in early May — even as candidates campaigned to become Yoon’s replacement.
The intergovernmental dimensions of Yoon’s North Korea policy, however, were more confrontational and controversial. These included: reorganization of the Ministry of Unification to de-emphasize intergovernmental engagement; several lawsuits against the Kim regime over South Korean–built facilities in Kaesong; a return to describing North Korea as an “enemy” in defense white papers; and eventually the suspension of a 2018 joint military agreement intended to defray inter-Korean tensions along the heavily militarized DMZ border. Perhaps most important, Yoon’s declaration of martial law blamed “the threats of North Korean communist forces” and “shameless pro-North anti-state forces” — a characterization widely seen as lacking credibility.
The Status Quo Ante Is a Mistake
If political muscle memory kicks in, as it seems to be doing now, South Korea’s next president may be tempted to simply revert to the policies of previous progressives: trying to improve relations with the North Korean government and de-emphasizing the rights of the North Korean people and defector population. Lee Jae-myung’s stated platform offers a more cautious vision than some of his predecessors, emphasizing family reunions and risk-reduction measures while avoiding more controversial symbols like summits, but he also proposed to restart the cross-border leaflet campaigns. Analysts are waiting to see whether his current rhetoric signals a true evolution toward pragmatism, or a savvy but temporary campaign pivot.
That would be a mistake, for two reasons. First, it ignores the risks presented by changes in Pyongyang. Second, the martial-law declaration and its aftermath have already been costly and chaotic for South Korean domestic politics, but this period has in some ways demonstrated South Korea’s commitment to democracy. The new president should not sacrifice the opportunity to use the crisis for good.
Aggressive turns in North Korean domestic and foreign policy over the last few years make a return to past approaches infeasible. In January 2024, Kim Jong-un announced that North Korea no longer considered South Korea a “partner of reconciliation and reunification” — instead, it became a “primary foe and invariable principal enemy.” North Korea later incorporated this shift into its constitution and destroyed one of the most visible symbols of the hope for reunification: the Arch of Reunification in Pyongyang. The regime has also strengthened “cultural protection” laws that crack down on the distribution and consumption of South Korean media, with penalties including execution. Executing citizens for liking K-pop and Korean dramas is difficult to square with a renewed South Korean effort at rapprochement.
Strategic developments in North Korea’s military-security sector have buttressed the changes in its political stance toward the South. Pyongyang announced an updated nuclear policy, including a list of circumstances under which it would consider nuclear first use. Development of its missile and drone programs has continued, including via reported cooperation with Moscow. Lastly, following the signing of a “Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with Russia in November 2024, North Korea sent troops to fight near Kursk in Putin’s brutal war against Ukraine.
The changes from the North have prompted corresponding developments in South Korea, aimed at strengthening its alliance with the United States and trilateral coordination with the United States and Japan. South Korea’s next president would be ill-advised to jeopardize these concrete defense and security benefits by pursuing a détente that Pyongyang has already rejected.
South Korea’s next president cannot ignore the changing reality of North Korea’s policies and behavior: Kim Jong-un is a belligerent dictator who has said plainly that he is uninterested in unification, regards South Korea as an enemy, and is actively fighting in a war of aggression against a sovereign European democracy. Any return to summitry without substantive changes from the Kim regime will appear naïve — and could lend support to those in Washington who may be reluctant to continue supporting South Korea’s defense.
But there is another, more optimistic reason for South Korea’s next president to reformulate inter-Korean policy: It gives the new president an unusual opportunity to demonstrate global democratic leadership. South Korea’s progressive leaders were on the frontlines of the fight for democracy in the 1980s, and the election of a new president in June will symbolize — in South Korea and for many around the world — the success of efforts to protect a democracy that was hard won and is worth defending.
In an era of backsliding, when democracy seems both fragile and under threat, South Korea’s response to impeachment has stood out as a bright spot. Citizens and civil society mobilized, legislators in both parties used their powers to constrain executive overreach, the military exercised restraint, and the Constitutional Court carefully and clearly outlined the grounds upon which martial law was illegitimate and damaging to the constitutional order. South Korea’s status as a global democratic exemplar — at a moment when things easily could have gone the other way — gives the next president unique credibility.
To make the most of this opportunity, the next ROK president, especially if he comes from the progressive side of the aisle, should resist the partisan temptation to be “anything but Yoon,” and avoid throwing the proverbial baby out with the bathwater. Embracing the strengths of South Korea’s identity as one of the world’s leading democracies requires taking the centrality of liberalism seriously: letting it guide South Korea’s approach to its own defector community, to North Korean human rights, and to inter-Korean relations.
Three Big Questions
The next South Korean president will have to rethink his answers to three questions that shape the heart of inter-Korean policy: What issues and democratic rights to emphasize? When to talk about those issues? And who to involve in the process?
When crafting inter-Korean policy, progressives typically emphasize economic rights and socioeconomic welfare, pursued through government-led aid and economic engagement; conservatives focus on the need for expanding civil and political rights in North Korea. A liberal-democratic approach should pursue both: It should offer humanitarian outreach that improves the socioeconomic welfare of North Koreans through intergovernmental channels where possible, and then also actively support civil society in filling the likely gaps. (It should also pursue these goals without the corruption charges that have damaged the credibility of past efforts at inter-Korean rapprochement.) Finally, the new government’s focus on improving socioeconomic welfare should explicitly include the welfare of resettled North Koreans in the South.
The next president must emphasize that rights apply to all citizens equally, including North Korean defectors. South Korea considers all North Koreans full citizens of the Republic of Korea; taking seriously this claim means that the next president must continue the ROK’s diplomatic advocacy and efforts to protect North Koreans abroad from repatriation or abuse. He must also allow defector-citizen activists who have resettled in the South to engage in free assembly and free speech, as allowed by the ROK’s constitutional democracy. My own research has shown that these civil and political rights are deeply valued by those who’ve left the North — as much or more than economic and social rights. Respect for these values must be reflected in policy.
When should each component of inter-Korean relations be emphasized? A new progressive president should retain human-rights advocacy as a pillar of South Korean foreign policy from the beginning, as that is when the world will be watching closely. The ROK should continue engaging in human-rights issues at the UN and advocating against the forced repatriation of defectors from China and Southeast Asia in its bilateral diplomacy.
South Korea should also lead global discussions on the emerging challenge of transnational repression. This is a major issue facing escapees from North Korea, and one where South Korea’s democratic identity, global convening power, and ability to offer concrete solutions could be a significant force for global democratic good.
Who should be involved in making and carrying out inter-Korean policy? Again, broad-based involvement from civil society will strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the new president’s inter-Korean policy. In the long run, too, people-to-people ties will be critical to unification — and the North Korean regime’s paranoia about foreign infiltration should not be a reason for a thriving democracy to block its own citizens from communicating with family or friends in the homes they left.
The North Korean diaspora is not a monolith. Some civically engaged defectors will have different ideas from the next president, but he should resist the temptation to treat them as obstacles to inter-Korean progress. Instead, he should recognize them as individuals whose bravery is consonant with South Korea’s own democratic activists, and as citizens with a legitimate stake in the future of their homeland.
Broad-based incorporation of civil society may also help insulate inter-Korean policy from the partisan polarization that plagues South Korean domestic politics, and help create a broader, more sustainable foundation for policy that lasts beyond the president’s time in office. Such an approach also invites global support for South Korea’s leadership, as defector communities abroad have previously recruited support from publics and leaders in the places where they reside, building successful transnational coalitions in the process.
The coming election presents South Korea’s next president with a choice. Reversion to old patterns, while familiar, fails to account for changing circumstances in North Korea, South Korea, and the global security environment, and could close doors for the people of South Korea and the whole Korean peninsula. Instead, South Korea’s next president should seize the opportunity to transform inter-Korean policy.
Sheena Chestnut Greitens is associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin, where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Copyright © 2025 National Endowment for Democracy
Image credit: GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
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