Ethiopia Is About to Hold Another Sham Election

Ethiopia’s elections are more like performative rituals than democratic contests. But these hollow exercises are becoming more dangerous as the country stares down a series of looming threats.

By Muktar Ismail

May 2026

For almost seventy years, from the reign of Emperor Haile Selassie to the present day, Ethiopia has seen a succession of staged elections that seem more about maintaining the status quo than giving citizens a real chance to choose their leaders. Since the Ethiopia People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) introduced the ethnic-federal system in 1995, there have been six general elections. The ruling party has won every time.

The general election, set for June 2026, is likely to follow this same path, but the situation is more precarious than ever.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize winner who was once hailed as a beacon of democratic reform, now leads a nation deeply divided along various fault lines. As the government, led by his Prosperity Party (formed in 2019 as the successor to a dismantled EPRDF), prepares for the upcoming election, Ethiopia is grappling with internal strife, widespread insurgencies, and the looming threat of conflict with Eritrea.

The growing disconnect between how the government presents the situation and the harsh realities faced by many Ethiopians has never been clearer.

Architecture of Predetermination

The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) has released figures that are meant to portray a healthy democracy: 47 registered political parties, nearly 11,000 candidates, and millions of voters. Yet these numbers conceal more than they disclose. Most parties either openly or subtly align with the Prosperity Party, while those genuinely attempting to present alternatives face obstacles ranging from bureaucratic red tape to state-sponsored violence.

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF; the long-dominant force in the EPRDF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), Oromo Federalist Congress (OFC) and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) are opposition groups with strong grassroots support. Yet their officials frequently endure harassment, arbitrary arrests, and significant difficulties in obtaining the necessary licenses to function as legitimate parties. They find themselves ensnared in a bureaucratic maze designed to drain their resources, waste their time, and distract them from their goals. In this way, the government aims to create the illusion of competition while suppressing any real political change. While throwing up obstacles against real opposition from the TPLF, OLF, OFC, and ONLF, the Electoral Board has simultaneously approved several opposition parties that are clearly aligned with the ruling party, as part of a strategic move to convince the international community that credible opposition exists.

These same tactics were extremely effective in 2021: The Prosperity Party won decisively at both the regional and national levels in the general election that year. Its near-total victory in parliament, securing 96.8 percent of the 547 seats in the House of People’s Representatives, suggests manipulated outcomes aimed at consolidating power rather than genuine public support. Although the legitimacy of the process was widely questioned, it served Abiy’s agenda: to conduct a ceremonial election while claiming to have popular support and the legitimacy to govern.

The Opposition’s Dilemma

Ethiopia’s opposition is now facing a tough choice that’s causing serious division among its members. Some factions believe that engaging in the political process is crucial, as stepping back would mean losing their limited chances to voice dissent. Conversely, others see the whole system as fundamentally flawed, pointing to the 2021 vote that took place amid the Tigray conflict (2020–22). Many criticized that contest — which excluded some parts of the country, was marred by the arrest of key opposition figures, and boycotted by many opposition groups — as proof that participating only legitimizes a corrupt system.

This lack of unity plays right into the hands of the government. If opposition parties were to come together, they could strategize, pool their resources, and pose at least a symbolic challenge. However, they remain split not just on tactics but also on the core issues surrounding Ethiopia’s political future — reflecting deeper disagreements over the constitution, ethnic federalism, and the road to genuine democratic change.

The structural mechanics of Ethiopia’s political system only deepen these divisions. The first-past-the-post electoral system complicates matters for opposition parties: In 2021, they collectively garnered 32 percent of the vote in the capital, Addis Ababa, but ended up with not a single parliamentary seat. This winner-takes-all approach is particularly damaging when combined with gerrymandering, voter suppression, and the disproportionate resources that incumbents enjoy. Thus in Somali Regional State, Oromia, and elsewhere, opposition parties opted to boycott the 2021 election due to government-imposed hurdles including intimidation, arrests, and restrictions on campaigning. Now, in the run-up to the 2026 election, the OFC is struggling to operate outside of Addis Ababa, where the party is running only ten candidates—a sharp decline from roughly four-hundred OFC candidates in 2005. According to the party’s chairman, its participation in upcoming election is mainly to prevent deregistration.

As we look toward the June 2026 election, the government’s ability and willingness to manipulate outcomes have only increased, even as its territorial control has weakened. National and regional officials are reportedly being directed to select candidates from token opposition parties aligned with the Prosperity Party. This setup aims to guarantee that opposition representation accounts for about 20 to 30 percent of the seats, creating an illusion of choice without any genuine competition.

Security Contradiction

The security situation in Ethiopia is deeply intertwined with the country’s electoral future, and is bound to have a major impact on the results. Recently, the Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM; an armed group that represents the Amhara ethnic group), issued a strong warning, declaring anyone who takes part in the electoral process an enemy of the Amhara people, just as it views the government itself. After more than two years of guerrilla warfare, Fano now holds sway over large swathes of rural Amhara and has been conducting operations against government convoys and officials, military personnel, and their bases without consequences.

Meanwhile, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) is also ramping up its activities across Oromia, taking advantage of the security vacuum as the Ethiopian military deploys more troops to northern Ethiopia. The OLA is expanding its operational control in the region. In Tigray, the once-dominant TPLF has been pushed aside, leaving many Tigrayans feeling disconnected from the rest of the country and apathetic about the upcoming elections.

In the regions of Amhara, Oromia, and Tigray, voting will be restricted to urban areas controlled by the government, effectively excluding vast territories — many under the control of insurgent groups — from participating in the electoral process. The NEBE has released an electoral map categorizing constituencies by security status. Green areas are stable, red areas are at risk of conflict, and yellow areas are in between. Opposition parties criticize the map for relying on unreliable government data. Making matters worse, the Electoral Board has yet to formally address this geographic limitation, a failure that seriously undermines any claims to national democratic legitimacy. And even if the NEBE could manage to safely hold the vote in these areas, the insurgent groups in control view the contest as fraudulent and would actively discourage voting.

On April 17, a coalition of eight political parties in Ethiopia threatened to withdraw from the June election unless authorities address alleged legal violations, intimidation, and administrative irregularities within seven days. The coalition accused the ruling party and state security of limiting the political space and warned against participating in what they called “illegal legality.” The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP) plans to hold a peaceful protest on May 8 to highlight the unfair electoral conditions and ongoing conflicts that are undermining the election’s credibility.

The NEBE’s Compromised Role

Since 2021, the NEBE’s reputation has taken a hit, with opposition parties claiming that the Board has been coopted by federal authorities. Recently, eight opposition parties have voiced concerns about the NEBE’s tough registration requirements, including birth certificates and national IDs, which are extremely difficult for rural and internally displaced voters to meet. These hurdles effectively disenfranchise a significant number of citizens.

Two choices, in particular, highlight the compromised character of the NEBE: the sudden decision in May 2025 to bar the TPLF from participating in the upcoming general election while allowing Getachew Reda’s Simret party to register. Getachew is advisor minister to Prime Minister Abiy on Eastern African Affairs and a former interim president of Tigray before being expelled from the TPLF in 2024. This move appears to have been coordinated with federal authorities in order to establish a compliant political force in Tigray.

Moreover, the NEBE has been linked to recent government actions aimed at disrupting the growing connections between Fano insurgents and Tigrayan authorities. Among these was the controversial decision in February to reassign disputed districts in western Tigray to Amhara, with the likely aim of stoking nationalist tensions on both sides.

In Somali Regional State, a similar strategy is at play: With backing from federal players and the Electoral Board, the Somali regional government has dismantled the legitimate Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and replaced it with a new faction that aligns with the Prosperity Party. This new faction has now been granted a license to operate as the official ONLF.

Adding to all this, international election observers are nowhere to be found, their deployment either blocked or indefinitely postponed. Domestic monitoring groups are constantly under threat, with their members facing surveillance, harassment, and the looming risk of detention. And journalists are barred from reporting in conflict zones and covering elections. Meanwhile, more than 1,500 civil society organizations have been shuttered in recent years and several more suspended, and the law governing them has gotten more restrictive. In such an environment, where civic oversight is severely constrained at best, the idea of free and fair elections shifts from being a goal to something that feels utterly ridiculous.

Regional Powder Keg

As Ethiopia gears up for its electoral moment, the northern front is once again on the brink of chaos. Tens of thousands of Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) troops have been deployed closer to Tigray’s borders, and Abiy’s aggressive talk about access to the Red Sea has raised alarms in neighboring capitals. This troop movement appears to have created an opportunity for Fano to overpower the local Amhara special police force and the remaining few troops that were supposed to fill the security gap left by the departing forces.

Tigray is teetering on the edge. The TPLF has reinstated its prewar leadership, defying the federal extension of the Tigray Interim Administration established after the 2022 Pretoria Agreement ended two years of conflict. Observers caution that without dialogue, the leadership crisis in Tigray could escalate into renewed fighting. Eritrean forces and weapons continue to pour into the border regions, hinting that both external and internal players are gearing up for renewed conflict, no matter the electoral schedule.

Meanwhile, Sudan’s government, led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), which is fighting a civil war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has accused Ethiopia of drone attacks on Sudanese targets, including Khartoum International Airport. Sudan has recalled its ambassador from Addis Ababa and threatened retaliation. Tension was already high over the establishment of a new RSF training base in northwest Ethiopia, though Ethiopia denies involvement and asserts neutrality in Sudan’s civil war. The risk of regional conflict is high. Just a tiny spark in northern Ethiopia or eastern Sudan could set the entire Horn of Africa ablaze, pulling in regional powers with clashing interests and turning Ethiopia’s domestic political crisis into a wider interstate conflict.

Right now, the situation is somewhat stable, but there are various theories about why Addis Ababa seems reluctant to dive into conflict. Some say it’s because the Ethiopian military is weakened from prolonged counterinsurgency efforts. Others think the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key ally, is wary of backing another war in Ethiopia while still dealing with the fallout from conflicts in the Middle East. Abiy’s recent trip to the UAE to shore up support amid rising tensions between Tehran and U.S. allies in the Gulf shows that outside influences are playing a big role in his political and foreign policy  choices—from supporting the RSF on behalf of the UAE to signing a controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland that grants Ethiopia a naval base or coastal access in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence.

In the meantime, officials from the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE at turns met with leaders in Addis earlier in the year, all stressing the importance of regional stability. These diplomatic moves might be limiting Abiy’s options, at least for now. But as Ethiopian politics has shown time and again, the prime minister’s quasi-messianic self-conception and willingness to absorb immense costs in pursuit of his vision make external pressure an unreliable constraint.

Constitutional Endgame

In even the most autocratic regimes, elections do more than just lend legitimacy. They provide data on national support, help identify trustworthy local allies, and create chances to reward loyal supporters while sidelining opponents. However, Ethiopia’s upcoming elections might have a more specific aim: to provide a democratic façade for significant constitutional changes.

It’s no secret in Ethiopian political circles that the Prosperity Party doesn’t think much of the 1995 ethnic-federal constitution. Abiy’s philosophy of medemer — meaning “synergy” — has always hinted at a shift toward greater centralization, although the precise contours remain deliberately vague.

The National Dialogue Commission, which was launched to much fanfare in 2022 but has made little real progress, is expected to suggest changes to the principles of ethnic federalism — revisions that would solidify executive power at the center while reducing both parliamentary oversight and regional autonomy.

A decisive electoral win for the Prosperity Party, no matter how it’s achieved, would provide the political leverage and perceived mandate needed for such constitutional changes. What will likely amount to a coronation in June may not just be an end in itself but rather a stepping stone toward deeper institutional transformation and regional restructuring — one that could redefine Ethiopia’s political landscape for generations to come.

A Coronation with Limits

At just 41-years-old, Abiy Ahmed stands out as a young leader in Africa. He’s made it clear that he intends to hold onto power for a long time, and there’s little evidence to suggest that any democratic checks will limit in his authority. His leans toward a quasi-imperial approach, where his personal ambitions take center stage — treating elections, insurgencies, regional conflicts, and humanitarian crises as mere hurdles in his quest for national transformation.

However, Ethiopia’s upcoming general election is more likely to expose the limitations of the state rather than showcase its strength. Countless Ethiopians reside in areas where voting is simply not an option — either due to insurgent control or the government’s inability to ensure voters’ safety. Many others have been displaced by fighting, their chances to register and vote hindered by the very conflicts the government claims to be addressing. Additionally, millions of Tigrayans will be watching an electoral process from which their region has been largely sidelined — a stark reminder that this “national” election is taking place in a country that, in reality, is far from unified.

The vote will go ahead, Abiy will likely be confirmed in his position, and the international community will probably offer lukewarm congratulations while pointing out “areas for improvement.” The machinery of democratic legitimacy will continue to churn out the results it was designed to produce. Yet no matter how grandly the coronation is staged, it cannot disguise the truth of a state whose control over both territory and the political space is shrinking, a society that’s splintering, and a political system that provides its citizens with little real choice.

In today’s Ethiopia, the limitations of elections have never been clearer — and the stakes for the Ethiopian people have never been higher.

Muktar Ismail is a regional analyst, a former humanitarian and development advisor to the President of the Somali region, and a former UN staff member.

Copyright © 2026 National Endowment for Democracy

Image credit: LUIS TATO/AFP via Getty Images