

Supplementary Figures for
“Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs”

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Figure 1: Proportion of Countries Enacting Foreign Funding Restrictions




Figure 1: For each year, the solid black line plots the proportion of countries that have enacted foreign funding restrictions. The figure indicates that over 50% of the countries in the dataset have changed their legal rules to put foreign funding restriction in place – 20 countries since 2002. By contrast, since 2002 only five countries in our dataset have updated their restrictions on political advocacy by NGOs (the grey dashed line).

Our data collection efforts are based on the texts of the NGO laws, as well as the following secondary sources:

International Center for Not-for Profit Law. “NGO Law Monitor” (2012).

USAID. “NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe” (2010).

USAID. “NGO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa” (2010).

World Movement for Democracy. *Country Reports, 2008 and 2011*.

Global Integrity. “Global Integrity Reports, Assorted Years” (2004-11).

Figure 2: Foreign Funding Restrictions around the World (2011)





Figure 2: We map foreign funding restrictions around the world, based on the coding rules described in the paper for classifying countries as restricted or prohibited. We find that such restrictions are widespread: a majority of the countries in our sample are either restricted or prohibited (12 prohibited, 39 restricted, 47 free).

Figure 3: Electoral Manipulation




Data from NELDA (2001-2010).

Figure 3: If domestic vulnerability is a predictor of foreign funding restrictions, then we would expect to see restrictions on foreign funding for civil society in those countries in which, over the last ten years, regimes have sought to prevent the opposition from participating in elections or undermined the integrity of elections by resorting to fraud. The data suggest this is indeed the case: where the opposition was allowed to contest elections and no concerns were raised about free and fair elections (the top panels), a majority of countries imposed no restrictions on foreign funding for NGOs. However, where such electoral manipulation occurred (the bottom panels), a majority of cases exhibit prohibitions or restrictions on external support.

Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov. "Which Elections Can Be Lost?" *Political Analysis* 20.2 (2012), pp. 191–201.

Figure 4: Anti-Americanism



Data from Pew Global Attitudes Project (2002).

Figure 4: Where politicians can realize an electoral benefit from cracking down on foreign funding for civil society, we should be more likely to observe such restrictions. Given that the U.S. provides a large share of foreign assistance for civil society, if this argument is correct, it should be the case that countries with high levels of anti-Americanism are more likely to adopt foreign funding restrictions. The data do suggest a slight relationship: the proportion of countries that impose restrictions is higher in countries that are more anti-American. But with such limited data (only 34 countries) on the views of citizens in countries that receive democracy assistance, the findings should be seen as suggestive at best.

The Pew Research Center. "Pew Global Attitudes Project" (2002)

Figure 5: Aid Diversion




Figure 5: Restrictions on foreign funding could be an attempt by leaders to limit the diversion of aid dollars to NGOs and away from government coffers. If this argument is right, one would expect to find foreign funding restrictions in countries that are dependent on aid but lack quality governance (the top right panel). These are the environments in which foreign donors would be most likely to substitute support for the government with assistance directly to NGOs. We find that while restrictions are far more likely to be put in place in countries with high levels of foreign assistance (the top panels), the quality of governance does not appear to matter.

We measure governance as an average from 2000-2010 of the “Control of Corruption” measure collected by the World Bank. Aid dependence is equal to foreign aid as a percentage of GDP averaged from 2000-2008.

Jan Teorell et al. “The Quality of Government Dataset, version 6Apr11” (2011).

Figure 6: Strategic Importance




Figure 6: In addition to domestic factors, we argue that countries less sensitive to international pressure will be more likely to restrict foreign funding to civil society. One way of evaluating this claim is to see whether foreign funding restrictions are more common in countries that receive a large share of U.S. military aid per capita – an indicator of a country’s strategic value. Figure 6 indicates that among the set of semiauthoritarian and authoritarian countries that receive a level of military assistance per capita that falls above the median, over 60% percent impose restrictions. While there are a set of isolated autocrats that receive no military assistance – e.g., Belarus and Eritrea – among the less democratic countries that are not international pariahs, it appears that receiving higher levels of U.S. military assistance provides more freedom to crack down on foreign support for civil society.

USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services. “US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations”. *Greenbook* (2010).

Figure 7: U.S. Foreign Assistance Pre-/Post-Restrictions on Foreign Funding




Figure 7: Foreign funding restrictions appear to have an effect on U.S. aid flows. Overall U.S. economic assistance drops considerably in countries that have prohibited foreign support for civil society (Belarus, Eritrea, Gambia, Singapore, and Thailand), and this effect is visible in the immediate aftermath of the legislation. It is also clear that foreign flows are substantially affected where governments restrict external support – on average, assistance levels drop from nearly \$50 million annually, to less than \$25 million once a new law is in place. By contrast, aid flows are higher, and continue to increase, in countries that continue to allow for a largely open environment for civil society.

USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services. “US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations”. *Greenbook* (2010).

Figure 8: NED Grant Totals Pre-/Post-Restrictions on Foreign Funding




Figure 8: Financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has not been as dramatically affected by restrictions on foreign funding for civil society. As an independent organization, NED appears to have escaped political pressure to accept new, restrictive legal frameworks and has found creative strategies for continuing its support for civil society groups in closed environments.

National Endowment for Democracy. “Grant Allocations, 1990-2011” (2011)