Change may be caused more by the frailty of the regime than the strength of the opposition, but in such cases the outcome is often less democratic.
Western pressure can be decisive, but it is not always easy to forecast when and how it will be applied.
Authoritarian weakness alone cannot explain why the mobilization process during the color revolutions assumed similar forms across varied contexts.
Structure, agency, and process all are critical in explaining the uneven pattern of electoral change in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia.
The opposition within Cuba has become more diverse as well as more unified, and the regime, despite its enduring capacity for repression, is showing signs of underlying weakness.
Although the transfer of power from Fidel to Raúl has been relatively uneventful, potential divisions within the ruling elite, especially between the military and the Party, are likely to emerge before too long.
Serbia has become a country where political contention is vigorous, but illiberal forces have shown an ability to adapt to the new conditions.
Democracy-aid providers are moving away from one-size-fits-all strategies and are adapting their programs to diverse political contexts. Two distinct overall approaches to assisting democracy have emerged in response.
A decade after the handover of their city to China, Hong Kong’s “pandemocrats” remain able to stand their ground at the ballot box.
The color revolutions illustrate both the prevalence of diffusion and the potential limits of its impact on political change.