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DEMOCRATIZATION THEORY
AND THE “ARAB SPRING”

Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz

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More than twenty-five years have passed since the publication of Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy, the four pioneering volumes edited by Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead that inaugurated third-wave democratization theory. More than fifteen years have passed since the 1996 publication of our own Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Looking back, what do we find useable or applicable from works on democratization from this earlier period, and what concepts need to be modified? In particular, what new perspectives are needed in light of the recent upheavals in the Arab world?

Here we focus on three topics that have been illuminated by the events of the Arab Spring: 1) the relationship between democracy and religion, especially in the world’s Muslim-majority countries; 2) the character of hybrid regimes that mix authoritarian and democratic elements; and 3) the nature of “sultanism” and its implications for transitions to democracy.

Conflicts concerning religion, or between religions, did not figure prominently in either the success or failure of third-wave attempts at democratic transition. The Roman Catholic Church of course played an important and positive role in the democratic transitions in Poland, Chile, and Brazil. But conflicts over religion, which were so crucial in Europe in earlier historical periods, were not prominent. For this and other reasons, religion was undertheorized in scholarly writing about the third wave. Yet the hegemony, perceived or actual, of religious forces over much of civil society in the Arab world, especially in the country-
Alfred Stepan delivered the ninth annual Seymour Martin Lipset Lecture on Democracy in the World on 13 November 2012 at the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and on November 15 at the Centre for International Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto. The text of his lecture was coauthored with his longtime collaborator Juan Linz, Sterling Professor Emeritus of Political and Social Science at Yale University, who was unable to be physically present for health reasons. Linz had been a student of Lipset, just as Stepan had been a student of Linz. This led Linz, in a message that was read to the audience prior to the lecture, to refer to Stepan as “Lipset’s intellectual grandchild.”

Seymour Martin Lipset, who passed away at the end of 2006, was one of the most influential social scientists and scholars of democracy of the past half-century. A frequent contributor to the Journal of Democracy and a founding member of its Editorial Board, Lipset taught at Columbia, the University of California–Berkeley, Harvard, Stanford, and George Mason University. He was the author of numerous important books, including Political Man, The First New Nation, The Politics of Unreason, and American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword. He was the only person ever to have served as president of both the American Political Science Association (1979–80) and the American Sociological Association (1992–93).

Lipset’s work covered a wide range of topics: the social conditions of democracy, including economic development and political culture; the origins of socialism, fascism, revolution, protest, prejudice, and extremism; class conflict, structure, and mobility; social cleavages, party systems, and voter alignments; and public opinion and public confidence in institutions. Lipset was a pioneer in the study of comparative politics, and no comparison featured as prominently in his work as that between the two great democracies of North America. Thanks to his insightful analysis of Canada in comparison with the United States, most fully elaborated in Continental Divide (1990), he has been dubbed the “Tocqueville of Canada.”

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side, had no parallel in the third wave. Thus the central role that Islam has played in the Arab Spring presents students of democratization with a novel phenomenon, and prompts them accordingly to come up with new concepts and fresh data to shed light upon it.

Samuel P. Huntington argued controversially that religion, especially Islam, would set major limits to further democratization. That suggested to one of us (Alfred Stepan) the idea of exploring what democracy and religion need, and do not need, from each other in order that each may flourish. Stepan argued that neither laïcité of the French sort (generally recognized not merely as secularist but as positively antireligious), nor a type of secularism that decrees a complete separation between religion and the state, was empirically necessary for democracy to emerge.

What was needed for both democracy and religion to flourish? The answer was a significant degree of institutional differentiation between religion and the state. This situation of differentiation Stepan summed up as the “twin tolerations.” In a country that lives by these two tolerations, religious authorities do not control democratic officials who are acting constitutionally, while democratic officials do not control religion so long as religious actors respect other citizens’ rights. Many different patterns of relations among the state, religion, and society are compatible with the twin tolerations. There are, in other words, “multiple secularisms.”

This term fits even the EU democracies. France retains a highly separatist, somewhat religion-unfriendly pattern of secularism with roots in the French Revolution. Germany, like Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, displays a very different pattern of state-religion relations that in German law is called “positive accommodation.” In the German case, this includes a state role in collecting taxes for the Roman Catholic and Lutheran churches. The twin-tolerations model, of course, can incorporate countries with established churches—overall, a third of the EU’s 27 member states have established churches, with the Lutheran Church filling this role in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, as well as the non-EU states of Iceland and Norway. All the varieties of secularism in Europe are consistent with religious toleration and democracy.

The crucial point is that multiple forms of secularism can be friendly to democracy and the twin tolerations. It should be better known than it is—particularly in most Arab countries—that close to 300 million Muslims have been living under democracy for each of the past ten years in the Muslim-majority countries of Albania, Indonesia, Senegal, and Turkey. If one adds the roughly 178 million Muslims who are natives of Hindu-majority India, the total number of Muslims living in democracies outside the West begins to approach half a billion. The Indian experience may be of particular interest, for it means that India had to be historically imagined—not to mention governed for the last six decades—as a democracy that incorporates a huge number of Muslim citizens.
India provides strong evidence against the presumption that there is something “exceptionalist” about Muslim attitudes toward democracy. In a recent survey with 27,000 respondents, India’s Hindus and Muslims alike reported themselves as supporters of democracy at an equally high 71 percent. Nearby in overwhelmingly Muslim Pakistan, the cognate figure was a mere 34 percent. That Indian Muslims should back democracy at more than twice the rate of their coreligionists who live just across the border—in a country with a far more checkered democratic history—underlines the great political contextuality of religion.

With that in mind, we should look at the Muslim world’s newly emergent democracies (Indonesia and Senegal, for example) and ask first if there have been any new conceptual emphases in Islamic political theology that have aided democratization in these places. Next, we should ask whether any new public policies regarding religion have been friendly to the twin tolerations while assisting democracy’s rise.

On the conceptual and theological front, we note a growing emphasis on the importance of the Koranic verse (2:256) that categorically asserts, “There shall be no compulsion in religion.” And as the Indonesian civil society leader, politician, and political scientist Amien Rais points out: “The Koran does not say anything about the formation of an Islamic state, or about the necessity and obligations on the part of Muslims to establish a Sharia or Islamic State.” Indonesian Muslim leaders say things like this often in order to argue against the imposition of shari’a in their country. To date, none of the Muslim-majority democracies has established shari’a as its legal code, and none has made Islam its established religion.

We can draw similar examples from Tunisia, which in 2012 became the first Arab country in more than three decades to receive a ranking of 3 or better for political rights on the 7-point Freedom House scale (in which 1 is most free and 7 is least free). Many pan-Arabists or pan-Islamists, not to mention backers of a global Islamic caliphate, often voice doubts about the legitimacy of individual states and the value of democracy in them. Yet in Tunisia as in Indonesia, some influential Islamic advocates of democracy have used the key Koranic concepts of consensus, consultation, and justice to argue that democracy will be most effective and most legitimate if it relates to the specificities of its citizens’ histories in a particular state. For example, Rachid Ghannouchi of Ennahda, Tunisia’s governing Islamist party since 2011, frequently says that his party should embrace the historic specificity that Tunisia

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for more than sixty years has had the Arab world’s most progressive and women-friendly family code.  

Another concept that is becoming important in Tunisia is not “secularism” as such (in Arabic the word for secularism, almaniyah, carries antireligious overtones), but rather the concept of a civil state (dawla madaniyah) instead of a religious state. In a civil state, religion (in keeping with the twin tolerations) respects democratic prerogatives—the people are sovereign, and they make the laws. Yet a civil state also respects some prerogatives of religion and its legitimate role in the public sphere. In a May 2011 interview, both Ghannouchi and Tunisia’s future prime minister, Hamadi Jebali of Ennahda, spoke extensively of the political imperative of a “civil state.”

What are some of the public policies and practices that have encouraged mutual respect between religion and democracy in Indonesia, Senegal, and also India?

First, all three actively contribute to the celebration of more religions than does Western Europe. For example, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland decree a combined total of 76 religious holidays on which workers, by law, enjoy a paid day off. Every such holiday comes from the Christian calendar; none are for minority religions. Indonesia, by contrast, has six such official Islamic holidays, and seven additional holidays to cover days sacred to such minority religions as Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, and Hinduism. Senegal has seven public Islamic holidays, and six for the less than one-tenth of the population that is Roman Catholic. Senegal also subsidizes pilgrimages to Rome for Catholic citizens. India has five official Hindu holidays, and ten to accommodate its many minority religions. All three countries also offer state funding to different religions, especially for religious schools and hospitals.

India, Indonesia, and Senegal also embrace greater degrees of policy cooperation between the state and religion than would be found under French-style laïcité or even U.S. doctrines of church-state accommodation. In all three countries, discussions between religious authorities and representatives of the democratic state have often led to policy consensus. In both Indonesia and Senegal, education-ministry specialists have worked with Islamic authorities to agree on mutually acceptable curricula, accreditation standards, and texts on the history of religion and Islam. One happy result has been that more parents than ever are choosing to send their daughters to school. Among Indonesians aged 11 to 14 today, 96 percent of boys and 95 percent of girls are literate.

In Senegal, the state asked the secretary-general of the National Association of Imams to inquire whether there is a Koranic basis for female genital mutilation (FGM). After study, the secretary-general sent all the Sufi orders a 43-page report saying that nothing in the Koran or early Islamic sources commands this custom or even indicates that it was ever
practiced in the families of Muhammad and his companions. The imam concluded by asserting that a proper understanding of Islam required all imams to cooperate with state officials in a joint campaign—its effectiveness later certified by the UN—to combat FGM.8

Such examples put in question the political wisdom of John Rawls’s injunction to take religion “off the political agenda” lest it interfere with the “overlapping moral consensus” that democracy requires. If democracy-inhibiting religious arguments are already on the political agenda, should Muslim leaders and activists who favor democracy not vigorously enter the public arena to show, from within their own tradition, that Islam and democracy are in fact compatible? Moreover, would it not be a good thing if more people in Arab countries—where “secularism” is too often seen as intrinsically hostile to religion—knew of the progress that Indonesia and Senegal have made toward relating religion, state, and society in ways that are friendly to both Islam and democracy?

Hybrids: The Case of Egypt

In our earlier work we listed five regime types: democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian, posttotalitarian, and sultanistic.9 To this roster we now propose adding a sixth type, the “authoritarian-democratic hybrid” regime. Like totalitarianism and posttotalitarianism, this is a “historically constructed” category devised to take into account a newly emergent phenomenon seen today in the Arab world and beyond.

No Arab country—not even Syria, and still less Egypt, Libya, or Tunisia under the dictatorships of Mubarak, Qadhafi, and Ben Ali—has ever had a fully institutionalized totalitarian regime as we define it. Therefore, the term “posttotalitarian” does not apply to Arab countries where dictatorships have fallen.10

Such countries can no longer be adequately characterized as authoritarian or sultanistic, either, and they are not (or not yet) democracies—hence the “authoritarian-democratic hybrid” label. This concept is obviously a close relation to regime types that other scholars have called “competitive authoritarian” or simply “hybrid.”11 We prefer the lengthier term “authoritarian-democratic hybrid” because it calls attention to the unusual condition of the countries so labeled: They are places where most major actors believe that they will lose legitimacy and their followers’ support should they fail to embrace certain core features of democracy (such as elections to produce the leaders of government), while believing at the same time that they must also retain (or at least allow) some authoritarian controls on key aspects of the emerging polity if they hope to further their goals and (again) retain their supporters.

It is possible that we will eventually stop calling this a “regime type” because it fails to last or become institutionalized. In that case, “situation” would be a better word. In the early 1970s, Juan Linz called military rule
in Brazil (a rule that began in 1964 and mixed authoritarian with democratic features) a “situation” and predicted that it would never manage to institutionalize itself. In a rare case of political science directly influencing political practice, it appears that the military regime’s chief strategist, General Golbery do Couto e Silva, saw an advance copy of Linz’s article and was influenced by it to persuade his colleagues that they should begin slowly to extricate themselves from government while they were still able to control the pace and circumstances of their withdrawal.12

It is highly possible that many of the Arab world’s current “hybrids” will also turn out to be passing “situations” rather than entrenched “regimes.” The evolutionary possibilities include, as in Brazil from 1974 to 1989, a transition toward democracy. Yet should the coercive apparatus find it too difficult and distasteful to coexist with democratic elements (as happened in Algeria in 1991), there could also be a transition, via a military coup or some other means, toward full-fledged authoritarianism.

Why do hybrid situations (if not hybrid regimes) come into being? Recent historical events such as the fall of communism, the entry of ten former communist countries into the EU, the demise of military governments in Latin America, and the aspirations raised by Tahrir Square do not mean the “end of history” and the reign of full democracy. Yet in countries such as Egypt, they have fueled a growing sense of the dignity of the individual, of people as citizens rather than mere subjects, and of democratic practices as things that are normally expected. In this new world, passively accepting for sixty years in a row one military officer after another as Egypt’s ruler is no longer possible. The three major players left standing after the last of those three officers (former Air Force general Mubarak) fell—the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and secular liberals—would have lost much of their legitimacy, and many of their followers, had they failed to embrace central democratic tenets such as reasonably competitive elections for the key offices of state. (Without relatively free elections, of course, a regime would not even qualify as hybrid, but would simply be authoritarian.)

Yet the generals, the Brotherhood, and the liberals all wanted to protect themselves in certain areas by placing limits on the right of democratic institutions to make public policy. Soon after Mubarak’s fall, many of the young secular liberals who had filled Tahrir Square began to argue that the MB was so strong and so fundamentally undemocratic that core liberal-democratic values could only be saved if secular liberals cut a deal with a nondemocratic source of power—the military. Many liberals argued that the military should help structure, or even write, the constitution before elections for the Constituent Assembly, or at the very least appoint a committee of experts to draft the constitution so that the Brotherhood could not constitute a majority.13

For its part, the SCAF supported the holding of elections and im-
licitly agreed, at a price, to maintain some controls on any Islamist majority that elections might produce. Only weeks before the 26 November 2011 parliamentary elections, the SCAF released the infamous “Silmi Document” asserting a variety of military prerogatives not found in any democracy. For instance, the document’s ninth article flatly asserted that the SCAF “is solely responsible for all matters concerning the armed forces, and for discussing its budget. . . . [the SCAF] is also exclusively competent to approve all bills relating to the armed forces before they come into effect.”

The Muslim Brothers, meanwhile, partly because they felt under attack from secular liberals, began early on to enter into understandings with the military. In keeping with these, the MB backed the generals’ unilateral decision to hold a constitutional referendum on the heels of Mubarak’s resignation, and kept silent about several incidents during the last three months of 2011 in which soldiers and police killed protesters, including at least 28 Coptic Christians. In return, the Brothers were allowed to take a historic step by assuming partial leadership of a controlled democracy.

More than is commonly understood, the cost of the Brotherhood’s gains (which included the elected presidency of Egypt) included a special position for the military in the new constitutional order, the economy, and regional government. The new constitution, largely written by the MB, stipulates a number of arrangements not normally found in democratic constitutions. For example, the document decrees that the defense minister must be a serving military officer (Article 195); provides for a National Defense Council comprising eight uniformed officers and seven civilians that votes on the military budget (Article 197); and gives the armed forces the right to try civilians in military courts for crimes that “harm the Armed Forces” (Article 198).

Much has been made of President Mohamed Morsi’s decision to sack certain key generals. Less has been made of his decision to name many of these cashiered officers to influential economic posts—overseeing the Suez Canal, civil aviation, and the extensive network of military-run factories—from which they can work to secure the armed forces’ already huge influence over the Egyptian economy. Moreover, instead of following Indonesia’s example and making regional executives elected, Egypt has adopted a constitution that is silent on regional elections. Retired military officers continue to fill many powerful regional posts. Such are the ways of an authoritarian-democratic hybrid state.

**What Was Different in Tunisia?**

Unlike Egypt, postdictatorial Tunisia, despite a destabilizing assassination in February 2013, has so far managed to avoid the strong admixture of authoritarianism that makes a hybrid situation or regime. The initial reasons for this were three. First, the leaders of the Ennahda party,
which was at one time close to the Muslim Brotherhood, since the early 1980s increasingly came to resemble Indonesia’s major Islamic groups in arguing that democracy was not only acceptable, but necessary. This eventually facilitated collaboration between Ennahda’s Islamists and secular liberals from other parties in joint efforts against Ben Ali.

Second, due to highly innovative “pacts” formed between secularists and Islamists before the transition started, there was a kind of inoculation against the intense fear of democracy’s consequences that drives hybrid authoritarianism. Each of Tunisia’s two secular authoritarian presidents, Habib Bourguiba and later Ben Ali, deliberately mobilized fear. Each claimed repeatedly that allowing competitive elections would bring to power Islamists who would be at best overly tradition-bound and at worst “terrorists.” Domestic peace, women’s rights, and secular liberals would suffer. Tunisians heard a great deal of this, but despite it, leading secular liberals began to ask whether they might have more in common with at least some Islamists than with Ben Ali, and the two groups considered (with some success) whether they could work together. Suspicions remain, of course, but most secular liberals do not fear Ennahda badly enough to want to use authoritarianism as a shield against it.

Third, in Tunisia by contrast to Egypt, not only civil society but political society began to develop. Civil society can play a vital role in the destruction of an authoritarian regime, but for the construction of a democracy, one needs a political society. In other words, there must be organized groups of political activists who can not only rally resistance to dictatorship, but also talk among themselves about how they can overcome their mutual fear and craft the “rules of the game” for a democratic alternative.

Although Egypt arguably had a more creative civil society than did Tunisia, the former’s specifically political society was and is woefully underdeveloped. As late as four months after Mubarak’s February 2011 ouster, the two key social groups that had opposed him—secular liberals and the Muslim Brotherhood—still had not held a single joint meeting to discuss democratic governing alternatives. The Brotherhood’s website was still displaying its 2007 draft party platform, complete with nondemocratic features such as a rejection of the idea that a woman or a non-Muslim (two groups comprising more than half the populace) could ever be president of Egypt, and a recommendation that a high court composed of and appointed by imams should be empowered to review all new legislation to ensure its compliance with shari’a. Small wonder, then, that a sense of growing distrust has continued to dominate the political atmosphere in Egypt.

In Tunisia, secular liberals and Islamists began meeting regularly eight years before Ben Ali’s fall to see whether they could reduce mutual fears and agree upon rules for democratic governance. That is, they began to create a political society. As described recently in these pages,
such efforts helped to lay the basis for the near-unanimity with which the roughly 155 consensually selected members of the country’s key post–Ben Ali reform commission voted for six major rules and principles to govern the selection and proceedings of a constituent assembly.14 Nothing like this happened in Egypt. There, the SCAF shaped all significant political dialogue with one unilateral communiqué after another (more than 150 all told) over the ten months following Mubarak’s fall.

Following a free election in October 2011, Tunisia’s democratic political society eased the formation of a three-party governing coalition. The heads of the two largest parties, Ennahda’s Rachid Ghannouchi and human-rights activist Moncef Marzouki of the secular Congress for the Republic, knew each other well, having met about twenty times in London over the eight years preceding Ben Ali’s fall.15 Tunisia’s post–Ben Ali political society has had to struggle with numerous problems, of course, but initially did so ably enough so that in 2012 Tunisia became the first Arab-majority country in 37 years to receive a political-rights score as good as 3 from Freedom House.

**Hopeful Trends and Disturbing Realities**

Transitions toward democracy are always filled with uncertainty. Tunisia’s is no exception. There are worrisome as well as reassuring trends. During Alfred Stepan’s November 2012 research visit there (his fourth since 2011) some of the reassuring trends were as follows:

1. In separate personal interviews, most of the presidents of the largest parties in the Constituent Assembly affirmed their expectation that, after numerous compromises, they would be able to gather a two-thirds majority of the Assembly behind the constitution they were writing.

2. Every major political leader expressed the belief that within eight months of the approval of the constitution, elections would be held, and that if the state could contain the increasing occurrences of political violence the voting would be free and fair.

3. Both governing-coalition members and oppositionists in the Constituent Assembly implied that if Ennahda proved unable to command another coalitional majority after these elections (there is a good chance that it will not be able to), Ennadha would, as in any democracy, peacefully step down, perhaps with a view to participating as a junior partner in some new ruling coalition.

4. The draft constitution had one major issue still unresolved: the powers of the executive. But there was growing confidence in November 2012 that an innovative and consensual solution could be found. Ennahda preferred a British-style parliamentary system but with proportional representation. Most of the other parties in the Constituent Assembly argued that, since Tunisia had just had a popular revolution, the people should have the right to play a role in choosing a president.
But these parties were painfully aware that from 1956 to 2011, Tunisia was ruled by presidents so strong they doubled as dictators. There was a growing trend within the Constituent Assembly in favor of a new model that we call “parliamentarized semipresidentialism” of the Portuguese sort—that is, with a weaker president and a stronger parliament than in France, and also with a significant role for a Constitutional Court in adjudicating any potential conflicts between parliament and the president.16

But there were also some disturbing realities in Tunisia that have now contributed, as of this writing in March 2013, to what many observers feel is the greatest challenge to confront democracy since Ben Ali’s fall:

1. Ennahda became legal only after the transition had begun. Prodemocratic rethinking had occurred within Ennahda, but mostly among its leaders in exile in London and Paris. Also, the hard-line secularist dictators Bourguiba and Ben Ali had nearly destroyed Islamic education within Tunisia, leaving a vacuum that Gulf-financed theocratic extremists rushed to fill amid the new conditions of greater religious liberty. Unfortunately, to date, Ennadha has not yet been able to effectively create alternative spaces and discourses in many key mosques and neighborhoods.

2. Aided by the incompetence or complicity of the police, on 14 September 2012 about a thousand lightly armed Salafi radicals occupied the outer courtyard of the U.S. embassy in Tunis for about three hours, before reinforced security forces drove them back. More than a hundred arrests were made. Rioters looted and burned the American Cooperative School of Tunis on the same day. These, and other incidents intensified criticism of the Ennahda ministers of the Interior and Justice by liberals and secularists for what they saw as underzealous control of the Islamist paramilitary Leagues for the Defense of the Revolution combined with overzealous attacks on secular antigovernment protestors.

3. In a display of what Juan Linz calls “semi-loyal opposition,” the new Nidaa Tounes party, led by Béji Caïd Essebsi—an elderly but charismatic politician supported by wealthy former Ben Ali loyalists and anticoalition secularists—staged a 23 October 2012 rally declaring that the government had lost its legitimacy because it had failed to finish the constitution within the promised one year following the elections of 23 October 2011. Essebsi called for a fresh mandate to govern, to be reached by roundtable talks held outside parliamentary channels, albeit with discussion and ratification by the Constituent Assembly.

4. The growing crisis intensified on 6 February 2013, when a leading critic of the government, Chokri Belaid, became the first political activist in democratizing Tunisia to be assassinated. The killing triggered a move by Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali of Ennahda to form a government made up solely of nonpartisan technocrats, but his own party would not go along with this and he resigned on February 19. In March, however, Ennahda ceded the cabinet portfolios for Defense, Jus-
tice, Foreign Affairs, and the Interior—the so-called sovereignty ministries—to nonpartisan technocrats. The new cabinet received a vote of confidence on March 13.

Varieties of Sultanism

Our third set of comments concerns the concept of sultanism. According to Max Weber, “Patrimonialism and, in the extreme case, sultanism tend to arise . . . when domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely personal instruments of the master.” Weber went on to emphasize the importance of the complete discretion of the ruler in a sultanistic system and indeed built it into his definition: Where domination “operates primarily on the basis of discretion, it will be called sultanism.” This means that in extreme cases of sultanism there is no autonomy of state careers. All officials, even generals and admirals, are best seen as being on the “household staff” of the sultan.

The ruler’s near-complete personal discretion is a hallmark of sultanism and one of the reasons why, in our original typology, we insisted upon a distinction between sultanistic and authoritarian regimes. Rafael Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961, made his son a brigadier general when the boy was nine. That is sultanism. General Augusto Pinochet, the military strongman who ruled Chile from 1973 to 1990, could never have done such a thing—the Chilean military had a degree of established autonomy as an institution and would not have allowed it. Pinochet might have headed the “military as government,” but the “military as institution” retained some of its own ideas and organizational autonomy.

Regimes can be almost entirely sultanistic in their characteristics or have some, but not many, sultanistic characteristics. It is useful to view sultanism as a continuum, for whether a regime is more or less sultanistic will affect the potential range of transitions away from sultanism that are open to it.

When a regime is close to pure sultanism, a relatively peaceful and domestically generated regime change via the classic “four-player game” of democratization theory (in which soft-liners from the regime and opposition work together to sideline the regime and opposition hard-liners) is virtually impossible. Once the two soft-liner camps reveal themselves, the sultan will destroy them. Seeing this, the hard-line oppositionists will grow even harder, vowing never to give up their arms to such a feared and hated foe. There will either be a violent transition or no transition at all.

Yet a regime that is less fully sultanistic might permit some autonomy to certain business and religious groups. Such a regime also might run into pushback from the “military as institution” if officers come to believe that continued support for the sultan will harm their core interests. If powerful forces from abroad (say a large neighbor or an interna-
tional body) weigh in on the side of democracy, then a fairly peaceful four-player game might ensue and lead to a reasonably rapid democratic transition. The end of the Ferdinand Marcos regime in the Philippines in 1986 is a rare example of this. In general, however, a sultanistic regime is far less likely than an authoritarian regime to give way to a peaceful, “pacted” transition, or one that leads to democracy. The presence of a sultan makes negotiation too difficult.

The Arab world remains predominantly nondemocratic, but none of its nondemocratic regimes is as sultanistic as was that of Trujillo. He treated much of the Dominican economy as his personal property, made no distinction between his personal regime and the state, decreed dynastic succession, and faced no coherent opposition from the military.

Before the Arab upheavals of 2011, the regimes in Libya, Syria, Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia all displayed (to one degree or another) some features of sultanism. Yet if we place them on a continuum and focus on the key variable of the “military as institution,” we can see crucial differences that contributed to five quite distinctive outcomes.

Qadhafi’s Libya was the most sultanistic, and saw no four-player game. Qadhafi created, dismantled, and re-created chains of commands and security structures at will. His sons were emerging as possible dynastic successors, and core security posts were in the hands of relatives. Few business groups could assume any politically relevant autonomy. It took a civil war—and massive help for the rebels in the form of a UN-backed NATO bombing campaign—to topple the “Brother Leader.”

Weber correctly asserted that a “state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory.” It will be a long time before such a successful monopoly claim can be made in Libya and a useable democratic state comes into existence throughout its territory. A reporter who had traveled widely in the country’s interior just two months before the 7 July 2012 parliamentary elections concluded:

Libya has no army. It has no government. These things exist on paper, but in practice Libya has yet to recover from the long maelstrom of Qadhafi’s rule. . . . What Libya does have is militias, more than 60 of them. . . . Each brigade exercises unfettered authority over its own turf. . . . There are no rules.

Rebuilding (or simply building) a useable state and a coherent security apparatus should have been the highest priority for both the interim Libyan government and the international democracy promoters who came to its aid. As it was, elections went forward rapidly and reasonably smoothly. But on 11 September 2012, one or more of the militias (it may have been Ansar al-Shari’a) assaulted the U.S. consulate in Benghazi and killed the ambassador as well as three other U.S. citizens. It took the Libyan government, with some U.S. support, hours to retake possession of the area. The Benghazi attack reveals in the harshest terms that with-
out a useable state there can be no safeguards for human rights, law and order, consolidated democracy, or effective governance. In Libya after sultanism, all these are in desperately short supply.24

Syria under Bashar al-Assad clearly has strong sultanistic features, such as the “dynastic” element. He “inherited” the presidency from his father even though he was working in England as an ophthalmologist before being summoned home for grooming as his father’s successor after his brother, the heir apparent, died in a car crash. Still, Syria was not quite as sultanistic as Qadhafi’s Libya. Parts of the business community and state apparatus enjoyed at least some internal autonomy. The security apparatus, however, has remained tightly controlled. Assad has no important security official in whom he does not have full personal trust, which means that nearly all must come from his own Alawite religious minority. The Alawite dominance within the coercive apparatus signals that we are not in Marcos or Mubarak territory here, where the organized military might unseat the ruler. The Alawite officers who do Assad’s bidding know that should he fall, they and their families will face mortal danger. In Syria, there are no influential regime and opposition soft-liners to carry out semi-public negotiations over the terms of the sultan’s exit. A civil war prevails, with numerous fronts and competing factions fed by external supply lines. We know of no situations where a long, complicated, and brutal civil war has led to a cohesive state and a rapidly emerging democracy.

Mubarak’s Egypt was beginning to display sultanistic features including extreme corruption, “crony capitalism,” and the “dynastic” grooming of Gamal Mubarak as his father’s successor. Yet the Egyptian military retained a good deal of institutional autonomy (far more than its counterparts in Libya, Syria, or Yemen), and it was easily able to protect its interests quickly and peacefully by pushing the octogenarian Mubarak out of power and into internal exile. The military thus forestalled the threat it feared from Gamal Mubarak, who was known for pushing economic changes that would have threatened the military’s vast industrial and commercial holdings. That the elder Mubarak, an air force general himself, in some sense represented the “military as government” made little difference when the interests of the “military as institution” were involved. By getting rid of him, the top generals at least temporarily enhanced their own popular prestige, as the crowds in Cairo’s Tahrir Square chanted “The people and the army are one hand!” Yet as we have seen, the next target of the military as institution turned out to be full democracy, as the generals decided that slapping limits on it was what their interests dictated in the new post-Mubarak world.

In Tunisia, the most sultanistic feature of Ben Ali’s regime was his habit of letting his wife and her family treat the Tunisian economy as their personal property. Yet Ben Ali’s repressive apparatus could not prevent an underground (or exiled) political society involving all the major opposition forces from coming into being and holding talks about what a
post–Ben Ali Tunisia should look like. Hence, when he fell, a relatively coherent and democratic alternative was on hand. Just as important, Ben Ali had relied on the police to do his dirty work and had allowed the small Tunisian army to remain professional. This enabled the “military as institution” to play a crucial role in bringing the dictatorship to a quick and nonviolent end. The army stopped the police from using lethal force to protect Ben Ali, and then it let the sultan know that troops would not shield him from protestors, but would assure him safe passage to Saudi Arabia if he left immediately. Wisely, Ben Ali took the deal. Then the army—a modest institution with few special privileges to protect—pivoted to supporting the democratic transition rather than indulging Egyptian-style worries about how to safeguard its own power and perquisites.

Neither the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, nor Poland’s Solidarity in 1981 succeeded in immediately creating a democracy. Yet each of these historic movements eroded forever the legitimacy of the dictatorial regime that it challenged. We think that the events of the Arab Spring at the very least have made Arab “presidents for life” increasingly unacceptable, and the dignity of citizens increasingly desired.25

NOTES


7. Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition.”

8. For more detail on these and other examples of policy cooperation between religious and state officials in Indonesia and Senegal, see Alfred Stepan, “Rituals of Respect: Sufis and Secularists in Senegal in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics 44 (July 2012): 379–401.

10. Although Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein at times had totalitarian ambitions and installed some totalitarian features in their respective regimes, neither boasted the institutional or ideological resources that sustained the totalitarian regimes of Hitler, Stalin, or Mao.


13. The Carnegie Endowment’s “Guide the Egypt’s Transition” blog highlighted the persistence of this hybridity by noting on 4 October 2011 that “In general, liberal parties would like the constitution to be written before elections take place, fearing that a post-election constitution-making process will be dominated by Islamists.” See http://egypt-elections.carnegieendowment.org/2011/10/04/constitutional-principles.


15. Alfred Stepan, personal interview with President Moncef Marzouki, Tunis, 1 November 2012.


24. On the requirement of “stateness” for all these values, see Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, chs. 1 and 2.