The Danger of Deconsolidation
Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk • Ronald F. Inglehart

The Struggle Over Term Limits in Africa
Brett L. Carter • Janette Yarwood • Filip Reyntjens

25 Years After the USSR: What’s Gone Wrong?
Henry E. Hale

Suisheng Zhao on Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival
Bojan Bugarič & Tom Ginsburg on Postcommunist Courts
Clive H. Church & Adrian Vatter on Switzerland
Daniel O’Maley on the Internet of Things

Delegative Democracy Revisited
Santiago Anria • Catherine Conaghan • Frances Hagopian • Lindsay Mayka
Juan Pablo Luna • Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe
The Danger of Deconsolidation

THE DEMOCRATIC DISCONNECT

Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

Roberto Stefan Foa is a principal investigator of the World Values Survey and fellow of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research. His writing has appeared in a wide range of journals, books, and publications by the UN, OECD, and World Bank. Yascha Mounk is a lecturer on political theory in Harvard University’s Government Department and a Carnegie Fellow at New America, a Washington, D.C.–based think tank. His dissertation on the role of personal responsibility in contemporary politics and philosophy will be published by Harvard University Press, and his essays have appeared in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal.

For four decades, Die Welt, one of West Germany’s leading newspapers, refused to acknowledge the existence of an East German state. Since the paper’s editors expected the communist regime to collapse within a matter of years, they put scare quotes around its initials whenever they discussed the German Democratic Republic (GDR). While other papers reported about the policies pursued by the GDR, Die Welt unfailingly wrote about the “GDR.”

Sometime in the summer of 1989, the paper’s leadership finally decided to give up on the pretense that the East German regime was on the verge of collapse. The communists had been in power for so long, and seemed so well-entrenched, that the scare quotes had become an embarrassing denial of reality. On 2 August 1989, reporters were allowed to drop the scare quotes when writing about the GDR for the first time in the paper’s history. Three months later, the Berlin Wall fell. On 3 October 1990, the GDR ceased to exist.

The editors of Die Welt radically misjudged the signs of the times. At precisely the moment when they should have realized that support for the communist regime was dwindling, they finally reconciled themselves to its durability. They were hardly alone. The collective failure of social scientists, policy makers, and journalists to take seriously the
possibility that the Soviet bloc might collapse should serve as a warning. Even the best-trained and most methodologically rigorous scholars are liable to assume that the recent past is a reliable guide to the future, and that extreme events are not going to happen.

Three decades ago, most scholars simply assumed that the Soviet Union would remain stable. This assumption was suddenly proven false. Today, we have even greater confidence in the durability of the world’s affluent, consolidated democracies. But do we have good grounds for our democratic self-confidence? At first sight, there would seem to be some reason for concern. Over the last three decades, trust in political institutions such as parliaments or the courts has precipitously declined across the established democracies of North America and Western Europe. So has voter turnout. As party identification has weakened and party membership has declined, citizens have become less willing to stick with establishment parties. Instead, voters increasingly endorse single-issue movements, vote for populist candidates, or support “antisystem” parties that define themselves in opposition to the status quo. Even in some of the richest and most politically stable regions of the world, it seems as though democracy is in a state of serious disrepair.

Most political scientists, however, have steadfastly declined to view these trends as an indication of structural problems in the functioning of liberal democracy, much less as a threat to its very existence. A wide range of leading scholars, including Ronald Inglehart, Pippa Norris, Christian Welzel, and Russell J. Dalton, have generally interpreted these trends as benign indications of the increasing political sophistication of younger generations of “critical” citizens who are less willing to defer to traditional elites. Keeping with a distinction made by David Easton in 1975, many scholars acknowledge that “government legitimacy,” or support for particular governments, has declined. But they also insist that “regime legitimacy,” or support for democracy as a system of government, remains robust. Thus people may increasingly feel that democracy is not working well in their country or that the government of the day is doing a poor job, but this only makes them all the more appreciative of the fact that liberal democracy allows them to protest the government or vote it out of office. According to this view, democracies such as France, Sweden, and the United States remain as consolidated and stable today as they ever have been.

In our view, however, this optimistic interpretation may no longer be tenable. Drawing on data from Waves 3 through 6 of the World Values Surveys (1995–2014), we look at four important types of measures that are clear indicators of regime legitimacy as opposed to government legitimacy: citizens’ express support for the system as a whole; the degree to which they support key institutions of liberal democracy, such as civil rights; their willingness to advance their political causes within the existing political system; and their openness to authoritarian alternatives such as military rule.
What we find is deeply concerning. Citizens in a number of supposedly consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe have not only grown more critical of their political leaders. Rather, they have also become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. The crisis of democratic legitimacy extends across a much wider set of indicators than previously appreciated.

What we find is deeply concerning. Citizens in a number of supposedly consolidated democracies in North America and Western Europe have not only grown more critical of their political leaders. Rather, they have also become more cynical about the value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that anything they do might influence public policy, and more willing to express support for authoritarian alternatives. The crisis of democratic legitimacy extends across a much wider set of indicators than previously appreciated.

How much importance do citizens of developed countries ascribe to living in a democracy? Among older generations, the devotion to democracy is about as fervent and widespread as one might expect: In the United States, for example, people born during the interwar period consider democratic governance an almost sacred value. When asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 10 how “essential” it is for them “to live in a democracy,” 72 percent of those born before World War II check “10,” the highest value. So do 55 percent of the same cohort in the Netherlands. But, as Figure 1 shows, the millennial generation (those born

**Figure 1**—“Essential” to Live in a Country that is Governed Democratically, by Age Cohort (Decade of Birth)

since 1980) has grown much more indifferent. Only one in three Dutch millennials accords maximal importance to living in a democracy; in the United States, that number is slightly lower, around 30 percent.¹

The decline in support for democracy is not just a story of the young being more critical than the old; it is, in the language of survey research, owed to a “cohort” effect rather than an “age” effect. Back in 1995, for example, only 16 percent of Americans born in the 1970s (then in their late teens or early twenties) believed that democracy was a “bad” political system for their country. Twenty years later, the number of “antidemocrats” in this same generational cohort had increased by around 4 percentage points, to 20 percent. The next cohort—comprising those born in the 1980s—is even more antidemocratic: In 2011, 24 percent of U.S. millennials (then in their late teens or early twenties) considered democracy to be a “bad” or “very bad” way of running the country. Although this trend was somewhat more moderate in Europe, it was nonetheless significant: In 2011, 13 percent of European youth (aged 16 to 24) expressed such a view, up from 8 percent among the same age group in the mid-1990s (see Figure 2).

Public-opinion data thus suggest a significant generational reversal. Not so long ago, young people were much more enthusiastic than older people about democratic values: In the first waves of the World Values Survey, in 1981–84 and 1990–93, young respondents were much keener than their elders on protecting freedom of speech and significantly less likely to embrace political radicalism. Today, the roles have reversed: On the whole, support for political radicalism in North America and Western Europe is higher among the young, and support for freedom of speech lower.²

Withdrawal from Democratic Institutions

People can have an abstract allegiance to “democracy” while simultaneously rejecting many key norms and institutions that have traditionally been regarded as necessary ingredients of democratic governance. Therefore, if we are to understand why levels of support for democracy have changed, we must study the ways in which people’s conception of democracy, as well as their degree of engagement with democratic institutions, have changed.³ Beyond support for regular elections, which are essential even according to the most minimal interpretation of democracy, full-fledged support for democracy should also entail a commitment to liberal values such as the protection of key rights and civil liberties, as well as a willingness to use the institutions of liberal democracy to effect political change.⁴ So how have political participation and support for liberal democracy fared in the recent past?

A battery of questions on interpretations of democracy was not fielded
in the World Values Survey until 2005, so there is not enough time-series data to measure directly how citizens’ understanding of democracy has evolved over time. It is possible, however, to analyze differences between generational cohorts as a proxy. Taking the pooled data from Europe and the United States, we find that attitudes toward liberal institutions do not differ radically among different generations. But a liberal conception of democracy is somewhat less entrenched among millennials (born since the 1980s) than their baby-boomer parents (born during the first two decades after the Second World War). In the United States, for example, 41 percent of those born during the interwar and initial postwar decades state that it is “absolutely essential” in a democracy that “civil rights protect people’s liberty.” Among millennials, this share falls to 32 percent. In the European Union, these figures are 45 and 39 percent, respectively.

Any minimally liberal understanding of representative democracy needs to encompass the notion that elections should be free and fair. So it is disquieting that in mature democracies such an interpretation of democracy, though still endorsed by a clear majority of the popu-
lation, is weaker among younger voters. In the United States, for example, only 10 percent of citizens born in the interwar years and 14 percent of baby-boomers say that it is “unimportant” in a democracy for people to “choose their leaders in free elections” (with “unimportant” defined as 1 to 5 on a 10-point scale of importance). Among millennials, this figure rises to 26 percent. In Europe, there is a similar, though less dramatic, pattern, with 9 percent of the interwar and baby-boomer generations versus 13 percent of millennials responding that free and fair elections are unimportant. (Since we lack time-series data on these measures, these findings are preliminary and will have to be confirmed by future surveys.) Moreover, there is no broad reason to assume that young people should, in general, be prone to a less liberal interpretation of democracy, as the opposite pattern is found in places such as China, India, and sub-Saharan Africa.

The health of a democracy depends not only on support for key political values such as civil rights, but also on the active participation of an informed citizenry. Indeed, following in the tradition of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s classic 1963 work The Civic Culture, successive studies have shown that civic engagement affects democracy’s ability to deliver public goods, to hold officials accountable, and to provide effective government. This makes it all the more troubling that there has been a long-documented withdrawal from formal democratic participation: Since the 1960s, voter turnout has fallen and political-party membership has plummeted in virtually all established democracies.

Just as younger generations are less committed to the importance of democracy, so too are they less likely to be politically engaged. In fact, in both Western Europe and North America, interest in politics has rapidly and markedly declined among the young. At the same time, it has either remained stable or even increased among older cohorts. As a result, overall levels of engagement have remained steady at around 60 percent in the United States and about 50 percent in Europe. In other words, the aggregate figure, important as it is in its own right, masks the most striking part of the story: the quickly widening generational gap in political apathy.

In 1990, both a majority of young Americans (those between the ages of 16 and 35) and a majority of older Americans (36 years and older) reported being “fairly interested” or “very interested” in politics—53 and 63 percent, respectively. By 2010, the share of young Americans professing an interest in politics had dropped by more than 12 percentage points and the share of older Americans had risen by 4 percentage points. As a result, the generation gap had widened from 10 percentage points to 26 percentage points. Among European respondents, who on the whole report less interest in politics than do their American counterparts, this phenomenon is even starker: The gap between young and old more than tripled between 1990 and 2010, from 4 to 14 percentage points. This is attributable almost solely to a rapid loss of interest among
Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk

young respondents. Whereas the share of Europeans aged 36 or older who were interested in politics remained stable at 52 percent, among the young that figured dropped from 48 to 38 percent (see Figure 3).

In both advanced and emerging democracies, the generation that came of age during the 1960s withdrew from traditional forms of political engagement, such as joining political parties and voting. This trend has continued, with millennials even less likely than their parents to participate in the democratic system via formal institutions. Most scholars have resisted the conclusion that young people are worryingly disengaged from democratic politics by arguing that a decline in conventional forms of political participation has been compensated for by a rise in “nonconventional” forms of activism, such as membership in new social movements or participation in protests and boycotts. Recent data from Wave 5 (2005–2009) and Wave 6 (2010–14) of the World Values Survey, however, suggest that this no longer holds true: The baby-boomer generation has not managed to transfer its proclivity to engage in nonconventional forms of activism to its children and grandchildren. As a result, more recent generations are not just disengaged from the formal institutions of liberal democracy; they are also less likely to participate in nonconventional political activities, such as joining new social movements or participating in political protest.

Historically, citizens have been more likely to engage in protests when they are young. So it is striking that, in the United States, one in eleven baby-boomers has joined a demonstration in the past twelve months, but only one in fifteen millennials has done so. In Europe, the picture is a little more mixed: Young respondents are more likely than older ones to have attended protests in the course of the past twelve months, but they do so at lower levels than previous cohorts did at the same age. This decline in political engagement is even more marked for such measures as active membership in new social movements. Participation in humanitarian and human-rights organizations, for example, is about half as high among the young as among older age cohorts. Thus we find that millennials across Western Europe and North America are less engaged than their elders, both in traditional forms of political participation and in oppositional civic activity.

Rising Support for Authoritarian Alternatives

It is clear that citizens today express less of an attachment to liberal democracy, interpret the nature of democracy in a less liberal way, and have less hope of affecting public policy through active participation in the political process than they once did. What is not clear is how serious a warning sign this is for democratic politics and institutions. Dwindling support for, and engagement with, political institutions might simply reflect the fact that liberal democracy no longer faces any serious competi-
tion from alternative regime forms. Perhaps the real reason that citizens who came of age after the end of the Cold War do not express the same fervor in supporting liberal democracy is not that they are indifferent toward their system of government, but simply that they have never experienced a real threat to it. Although this optimistic reading may at first seem plausible, it does not square with the fact that explicit support for authoritarian regime forms is also on the rise.

In the past three decades, the share of U.S. citizens who think that it would be a “good” or “very good” thing for the “army to rule”—a patently undemocratic stance—has steadily risen. In 1995, just one in sixteen respondents agreed with that position; today, one in six agree. While those who hold this view remain in the minority, they can no longer be dismissed as a small fringe, especially since there have been similar increases in the number of those who favor a “strong leader who doesn’t have to bother with parliament and elections” and those who want experts rather than the government to “take decisions” for the country. Nor is the United States the only country to exhibit this trend. The proportion agreeing that it would be better to have the army rule has risen in most mature democracies, including Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Similarly, while 43 percent of older Americans, including those born between the world wars and their baby-boomer children, do not believe that it is legitimate in a democracy for the military to take over when

![Figure 3—The Widening “Political Apathy Gap”](image-url)

Note: We compared the shares of U.S. and European respondents who reported being “fairly interested” or “very interested” in politics across two age cohorts: those 16 to 35 years old and those 36 or older. European countries included in both waves (constant sample) are Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. Number of valid responses: United States, 1990: 1,812; United States, 2011: 2,210; Europe, 1990–93: 13,588; Europe, 2010–12: 8,771.

the government is incompetent or failing to do its job, the figure among millennials is much lower at 19 percent. In Europe, the generation gap is somewhat less stark but equally clear, with 53 percent of older Europeans and only 36 percent of millennials strongly rejecting the notion that a government’s incompetence can justify having the army “take over.”

Strikingly, such undemocratic sentiments have risen especially quickly among the wealthy. In 1995, the “rich” (defined as deciles 8 to 10 on a ten-point income scale) were the most opposed to undemocratic viewpoints, such as the suggestion that their country would be better off if the “army” ruled. Lower-income respondents (defined as deciles 1 to 5) were most in favor of such a proposition. Since then, relative support for undemocratic institutions has reversed. In almost every region, the rich are now more likely than the poor to express approval for “having the army rule.” In the United States, for example, only 5 percent of upper-income citizens thought that army rule was a “good” or “very good” idea in the mid-1990s. That figure has since risen to 16 percent. By way of comparison, in Latin America in the mid-1990s, a decade after the return to civilian rule, 21 percent of upper-income respondents still supported military rule. That figure now stands at 33 percent.

The idea that support for military rule has markedly increased among wealthy citizens of long-established liberal democracies is so counterintuitive that it naturally invites skepticism. Yet it is consistent with similar survey items that measure citizens’ openness to other authoritarian alternatives. In the United States, among all age cohorts, the share of citizens who believe that it would be better to have a “strong leader” who does not have to “bother with parliament and elections” has also risen over time: In 1995, 24 percent of respondents held this view; by 2011, that figure had increased to 32 percent. Meanwhile, the proportion of citizens who approve of “having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country” has grown from 36 to 49 percent. One reason for these changes is that whereas two decades ago affluent citizens were much more likely than people of lower income groups to defend democratic institutions, the wealthy are now moderately more likely than others to favor a strong leader who can ignore democratic institutions (see Figure 4 below).

Remarkably, the trend toward openness to nondemocratic alternatives is especially strong among citizens who are both young and rich. Returning to the question of approval for military rule, in 1995 only 6 percent of rich young Americans (those born since 1970) believed that it would be a “good” thing for the army to take over; today, this view is held by 35 percent of rich young Americans. Nor is the United States an outlier among mature democracies. In Europe in 1995, 6 percent of high-income earners born since 1970 favored the possibility of “army rule”; today, 17 percent of young upper-income Europeans favor it. This is a striking finding: Rising support for illiberal politics is driven not only by the disem-
powered, middle-aged, and underemployed. Its vocal supporters can also be found among the young, wealthy, and privileged.

While support for military rule among the young and the wealthy may seem like an aberration, their embrace of nondemocratic practices and institutions should not come as a surprise. If we widen the historical lens, we see that, with the exception of a brief period in the late twentieth century, democracy has usually been associated with redistributive demands by the poor and therefore regarded with skepticism by elites. The newfound aversion to democratic institutions among rich citizens in the West may be no more than a return to the historical norm.6

Is Democracy Deconsolidating?

One of the key findings of comparative politics is the astonishing stability of wealthy consolidated democracies. In the first years of their existence, both poor and wealthy democracies are vulnerable to regime change. Poor democracies remain in danger even when they have been democratic for a number of years and have successfully changed governments through elections. Democracies that are both wealthy and consolidated, however, appear to be safe: As Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi have shown, no consolidated democracy with a GDP per capita of over $6,000 in 1985 international prices has ever collapsed.7

This key finding has underwritten an important body of literature on democratization and regime stability, but it has simultaneously occluded an entire area of study. Apparently secure in the knowledge that wealthy consolidated democracies will not experience regime breakdown, political scientists have abstained from pursuing questions that would seem to be among the most fundamental for the discipline: What can empirical

---

**Figure 4—Support for Authoritarianism by Income in the U.S.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Upper-Income Respondents</th>
<th>Lower- and Middle-Income Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* World Values Surveys, Waves 3 through 6 (1995–2014). Data from the U.S. sample only. Upper-income defined as the top three income deciles (8–10 on a 10-point scale). Lower and middle income defined as the bottom seven deciles (1–7 on a 10-point income scale). Sample size: upper-income respondents (1,172); lower- and middle-income respondents (4,659).
indicators tell us about whether rich consolidated democracies are as stable as they were in the past? Do empirical indicators give us reason to believe that seemingly stable democracies may be in trouble? And what might happen if wealthy democracies do eventually start to experience occasional breakdown, as have virtually all other political-regime types in the history of mankind?

In the famous formulation of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, democracies are consolidated when they are the "only game in town." This metaphor is as elusive as it is evocative. What does it mean, in concrete terms, for democracy to be the only game in town? In our view, the degree to which a democracy is consolidated depends on three key characteristics: the degree of popular support for democracy as a system of government; the degree to which antisystem parties and movements are weak or nonexistent; and the degree to which the democratic rules are accepted.

This empirical understanding of democratic consolidation opens up conceptual space for the possibility of “democratic deconsolidation.” In theory, it is possible that, even in the seemingly consolidated democracies of North America and Western Europe, democracy may one day cease to be the “only game in town”: Citizens who once accepted democracy as the only legitimate form of government could become more open to authoritarian alternatives. Stable party systems in which all major forces were once united in support of democracy could enter into phases of extreme instability or witness the meteoric rise of antisystem parties. Finally, rules that were once respected by all important political players could suddenly come under attack by politicians jostling for partisan advantage.

It is at least plausible to think that such a process of democratic deconsolidation may already be underway in a number of established democracies in North America and Western Europe. In the United States, citizens have rapidly lost faith in the political system; in early March 2016, for example, public approval of Congress stood at a mere 13 percent. Wealthy businessman and television personality Donald Trump, having attracted fervent and surprisingly broad support by railing against the political system and promising policies that would openly violate the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, appears to have won the Republican nomination for the presidency of the United States. Meanwhile, even mainstream political actors are increasingly willing to violate the informal rules for the sake of partisan advantage: To name but one example of the resulting gridlock and constitutional dysfunction, the U.S. Senate has refused even to consider President Barack Obama’s nominee for a vacant seat on the Supreme Court.

In Europe, too, there have been many signs of democratic deconsolidation in recent years. Approval ratings for the continent’s leading politicians stand at record lows, and citizens have grown deeply mistrustful of their political institutions. Far-right populist parties, such as France’s National Front or the Sweden Democrats, have risen from obscurity to
transform the party system of virtually every Western European country. Meanwhile, parts of Central and Eastern Europe bear witness to the institutional and ideological transformations that might be afoot: In Poland and Hungary, populist strongmen have begun to put pressure on critical media, to violate minority rights, and to undermine key institutions such as independent courts.

To answer the question of whether democracy is deconsolidating in these countries in a rigorous manner would require a research program of considerable breadth that is beyond the scope of a single essay focusing on public-opinion data. But before such a project can get off the ground, an important empirical puzzle needs to be identified and a set of coherent explanatory goals formulated.

If we take the number of people who claim to endorse democracy at face value, no regime type in the history of mankind has held such universal and global appeal as democracy does today. Yet the reality of contemporary democracies looks rather less triumphant than this fact might suggest. Citizens of democracies are less and less content with their institutions; they are more and more willing to jettison institutions and norms that have traditionally been regarded as central components of democracy; and they are increasingly attracted to alternative regime forms.

Far from showing that citizens have merely become more willing to criticize particular governments because their expectations of democracy have grown, this indicates a deep tension at the heart of contemporary politics: Even as democracy has come to be the only form of government widely viewed as legitimate, it has lost the trust of many citizens who no longer believe that democracy can deliver on their most pressing needs and preferences. The optimistic view that this decline in confidence merely represents a temporary downturn is no more than a pleasing assumption, based in part on a reluctance to call into question the vaunted stability of affluent democracies.

Democracies do not die overnight, nor do democracies that have begun to deconsolidate necessarily fail. But we suspect that the degree of democratic consolidation is one of the most important factors in determining the likelihood of democratic breakdown. In a world where most citizens fervently support democracy, where antisystem parties are marginal or nonexistent, and where major political forces respect the rules of the political game, democratic breakdown is extremely unlikely. It is no longer certain, however, that this is the world we live in.

Even if subsequent research should show that democratic deconsolidation really is underway, this would not mean that any particular democracy would soon collapse. Nor is it obvious that the democracy that had deconsolidated the most would be the first to fail. Regime change is always a matter of accident as well as intention, of historical circumstances as well as structural preconditions. But if democratic deconsolidation were
proven to be in progress, it would mean that what was once unthinkable should no longer be considered outside the realm of possibility. As democracies deconsolidate, the prospect of democratic breakdown becomes increasingly likely—even in parts of the world that have long been spared such instability. If political scientists are to avoid being blindsided by the demise of established democracies in the coming decades, as they were by the fall of communism a few decades ago, they need to find out whether democratic deconsolidation is happening; to explain the possible causes of this development; to delineate its likely consequences (present and future); and to ponder the potential remedies.

NOTES

1. These gaps remain consistent at other points in the spectrum. If we take responses of 9 or 10, then the rate declines from 85 percent among Americans born in the 1930s to 43 percent among those born since the 1980s, and from 68 percent of Europeans born in the 1930s to 59 percent born since the 1980s. At the other end of the spectrum, the share of respondents expressing no clear importance to living in a democracy (1 to 5 on the scale) constitutes only 4 percent of Americans born in the 1930s, but 21 percent of millennials, and 6 percent of Europeans born in the 1930s, but 11 percent of millennials.

2. Support for radicalism is measured by responses to a left-right political scale, with “1” as radical left and “10” as radical right. In both Europe and North America, self-reported political radicalism is higher among the youngest age cohort (born since 1980) than any previous generation in any previous survey.


